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This study examines the earnings forecast accuracy of newly listed companies on the Athens 
Stock Exchange and further investigates the relationship between earnings forecast and 
pricing of IPOs. It uses a unique data set of 208 IPOs, which were floated during the period of 
January 1994 to December 2001 in the Athens Stock Exchange. The results suggest that 
investors are able to anticipate forecast errors at the time of listing. Pricing of IPOs indicate 
that firms with negative earnings forecast (pessimistic) are associated with low level of 
underpricing while optimistic management earning forecast can be a signal for high initial 
returns. Three variables – age of the IPOs, ownership by insiders and industry classification 
significantly contribute towards accuracy of earnings forecast. 
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I. Introduction 
An important feature in the going public procedure is the prospectus, a legal document that 
aims to reduce information asymmetries and inform the investors on the financial status of 
newly listed firms. Initial public offerings (IPOs) worldwide use prospectuses to publish 
financial forecasts (i.e. earnings, sales, expenses) based on their confidence in an accurate 
prediction, bearing in mind the voluntarily/mandatory status that depends on the country in 
which they want to go public.  
 The study of management forecast accuracy can be instructive with regards to several 
capital market issues. Waymire (1984), Lev and Penman (1990), King et al (1990), Firth 
(1998) and Cheng and Firth (2000) demonstrate that an earnings forecast can be an extremely 
important signal of company valuation, and public disclosure of forecasts can reduce 
information asymmetry between managers and investors and hence lower agency costs. 
However, in order for the earnings forecast to be useful, it needs to be accurate.  
The motivation for this study stems from the fact that there is a paucity of research in 
earnings forecast accuracy at the European level (except the evidences for UK) and 
internationally in markets outside of the commonwealth countries. Only few years back there 
were two studies at the international level for markets outside of British Commonwealth 
status, by Lonkani and Firth (2005) for Thailand and Jaggi et al (2006) for Taiwan. Our aim is 
that the emerging findings of the present study will assist investors with their future 
assessment of earnings forecasts, which will in turn further enhance their understanding of 
equity valuation. 
Additionally there are only few studies examining the association between 
management forecast accuracy and pricing of IPOs. This paper sheds light on the IPO pricing 
phenomenon and its connection to forecast error by providing ground to the initial returns 
reported in each FE category. It appears that IPOs with pessimistic forecasts are rewarded 
with low level of underpricing in the immediate aftermarket and they ‘leave small amount of 
money on the table’. Furthermore, there are evidences that Greek market has mechanisms to 
recognize IPOs with optimistic forecasts. 
The primary objective is to examine the management’s forecast accuracy in Greece for 
firms seeking a listing on the Athens Stock Exchange. The research is important as earnings 
forecasts are the major valuation factor for IPOs in Greece and so this is an important study 
for both institutions and private investors (helping them to make future investment decisions 
on new issues). The mandatory status in Greece for new firms to furnish management 
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earnings forecasts in their prospectuses provides a rare test case for an ongoing debate on the 
usefulness of the forecasts in the market valuation of IPOs.  
Mandatory forecast of earnings would allow the investors to search how accurately a 
firm can provide this figure. Comparing to countries with voluntary supplied forecasts the big 
advantage of mandatory disclosure is that it helps investors to explore the low quality IPOs 
and segregate them from promising firms. Those IPOs are naked with this method as they 
have neither the ability nor incentives to make good prediction so they provide a forecast with 
big error. On the other hand their bad quality can be hidden behind the choice option that 
voluntarily method creates. Additionally mandatory status helps some good firms which 
would be skeptical to reveal their forecast earnings under the voluntary method to signal their 
quality by providing an accurate figure.          
The next section of the paper reviews some of the literature on the accuracy of IPO 
earnings forecasts. The institutional characteristics of the new-issue process in Greece are 
described in section III. Determinants of earnings forecasts are analysed in section IV and this 
is followed by a methodology and data description in section V. Section VI provides a 
presentation and discussion of the results. Finally, a summary and conclusion are made.   
 
II. Previous Research 
 
Disclosure of management earnings forecasts is optional in many markets. When it comes to 
the voluntary disclosure of profits there is great interest by researchers (Trueman, (1986); 
Darrough and Stoughton, (1990); Darrough, (1993); Frankel et al, (1995)) on studying the 
accuracy of this information. Many studies have been conducted for countries with less 
litigious environments including mainly British Commonwealth States (Australia, Canada, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and South Africa). On the other hand, there 
has been only one study on forecasts in the U.S. market, put forward by Kasznik (1999). The 
disclosure of earnings forecasts for IPOs in the U.S. has been almost non-existent due to its 
highly competitive environment.    
Keasey and McGuiness (1991) examine the accuracy of voluntary earnings forecasts 
in IPO prospectuses in the UK market. They address that the disclosure of this information 
depends upon a firm’s competitive situation relative to other players. Their findings reveal a 
positive bias, and they report that management typically underestimates future earnings. 
Clarkson et al (1989) for Canada, Firth et al (1995) for Singapore, Jelic et al (1998) for 
Malaysia, Mbuthia and Ward (2003) for South Africa and Jaggi et al (2006) for Taiwan all 
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predict positive forecast errors. On the other hand, Firth and Smith (1992) for New Zealand, 
Hartnett and Romcke (2000) for Australia and Lonkani and Firth (2005) for Thailand report 
negative average forecast errors.  
Evidence on the accuracy of management earnings forecast reveals absolute forecast 
errors from as low as 10.4% by Firth (1998) for Singapore and 11% for UK by Keasey & 
McGuinness (1991) to an enormous 1138% reported by Lee (1993) for Australia. The last 
high result attracted more researchers to study the Australasian case. In a more recent study 
Hartnett & Romcke (2000) report a high 88.29%, which indicates that the regulatory 
environment should become more strict in the case of Australian IPOs.  
A similar outcome is indicated by studies carried out in New Zealand with AFE, 
which vary from 100% in the study by Mak (1989) up to 328% by (Firth & Smith, (1992). 
The level of errors is high compared to UK: Keasey & McGuinness (1991) at 11%, and Hong 
Kong by Jaggi (1997) at 12.79%. Table 1 summarizes the results of previous studies on 
forecasting and the accuracy of earnings forecasts in IPOs prospectuses.  
 
‘Insert Table 1 about here’
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III. Institutional framework of ASE 
 
The ASE began its operations in 1879 and is the oldest stock exchange in the Balkan area and 
one of the oldest stock markets on the European continent. It took more than a century for the 
exchange to taste considerable growth. During the last decade of the twentieth century, many 
regulatory changes brought a revolution in the number of firms traded on the ASE. The 
number of companies climbed from 150 at the end of 1993 to more than 330 at the end of 
2001. The Main market is the major component of the ASE associated with Parallel and New 
Markets. Most of the firms are traded in the Main market while during the period of our study 
there were more entrances into the Secondary (parallel) market of the ASE. The total market 
capitalisation of the firms traded has increased from €9.8 billion at the end of 1994 to €200 
billion at the end of 1999. Another noticeable area of growth is observed in the net profits of 
the IPOs, which increased from €560 million in 1993 to €1.7 billion by the end of 2001.  
The Athens Stock Exchange, in principal, requires new issues to make mandatory 
disclosure of profit forecasts in their prospectuses. Thus, Greece is one of the few countries 
that, in order to reduce information asymmetry, the managers of firms making IPOs are 
required to disclose a profit forecast for the forthcoming year. Similar places experiencing this 
shift are the markets in Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Thailand. In contrast, IPOs in 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, South Africa, Taiwan and U.S. are not required to disclose a 
profit forecast in their prospectuses. In addition, the London Stock Exchange requires 
companies to include a statement of financial and trading prospects in their prospectuses while 
profit forecasts are not mandatory. 
 
IV. Methodology & Sample Description 
 
A. Models on earnings forecast 
The accuracy of earnings forecasts that are disclosed in the Greek IPO prospectus is examined 
by using common forecast error measures, which have been referred to in the literature by 
(Chan et al., (1996); and Jelic et al., (1998)). Comparing actual earnings figures for 
‘accounting year t’ with earnings forecasts gives an indication of their accuracy. The most 
widely used forecast errors metrics are forecast error, absolute forecast error, and square 
forecast error. The forecast error measures are estimated, as shown below.  
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The forecast error for company (i) for the year of the IPO (t) is calculated as follows: 
 
itititit FPFPAPFE /)(  ,                                                    (1) 
 
Where FEit, is the forecast error for company i, APit, stands for actual profit for company i; 
and FPit, is the forecast profit as given in the IPO prospectus. 
 
The mean forecast error is a measure of bias in forecasting. It examines whether company 
management systematically over or underestimates earnings for firms in Greece. By 
examining the sign of the forecast error (positive and negative), we can conclude whether a 
company is optimistic or pessimistic about its future profits since we test whether the profits 
are overestimated or underestimated. A positive value for the mean forecast error (MFE) 
implies that, on average, IPO companies have a pessimistic bias (firms under-forecast) while a 
negative value for MFE represents an optimistic bias (firms over-forecast). 
The Absolute Forecast Error (AFE) is taken using the absolute value of the forecast 
errors (FEs) for each Greek IPO. In this study, the ‘absolute forecast error’ measures the 
relative deviation of actual earnings from forecast earnings and provides an indication of how 
close the forecasts were to actual profits in absolute terms. The earnings are before tax and 
before extraordinary items. Brown et al. (2000) report that the absolute forecast error 
measures forecast accuracy and the signed forecast error measures the bias. The AFE is 
measured by:   
                                    AFEit=│(APit-FPit) │/ │FPit│,                                               (2) 
 
Where AFE=Absolute Forecast Error 
Square Forecast Error (SQFE) is measured using the square of the forecast error. The 
squared forecast error gives more weight to large errors and, as Bhaskar and Morris (1984) 
specify, it is more appropriate for an analysis of investors’ losses due to forecast inaccuracy. 
Firth and Smith (1992) specify that squared forecast error better models the loss to investors 
due to an erroneous forecast.  
 
                                     SQFEit=((APit-FPit)/|FPit|)
2
,                                             (3) 
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Brown et al. (1987) introduced a statistic that measures the superiority of forecasting profits 
(SUP) relative to the actual changes in profits. Management forecast superiority measures the 
ability of management to anticipate earnings more accurately than time series models. This 
measure is adapted for the Greek IPO market. One reason for the use of this metric is the 
difficulty in predicting the earnings of a specific Greek company. Positive value for SUP 
means that the Greek IPO profit forecast is more accurate than a forecast based on the random 
walk model. Otherwise, a negative value implies that the IPO forecast is inaccurate.  
 
The measure of superiority is applied here for the IPO market:  
 
SUP=ln[(APt-APt-1)/(APit-FPt)]
2
,                                          (4) 
 
Where SUP is the superiority in forecasting profits relative to the actual change in profits, 
APt, stands for actual profit in year t, APt-1 is the actual profit in year t-1 and FPt symbolises 
the forecast profit in year t;  
The denominator measures the error in the IPO forecast while the numerator is the 
change in profit from year t-1 to year t. The numerator can also be regarded as the forecast 
error from a simple time series forecasting process, where APt-1 is a random walk model 
estimate of the profit in year t.  
 
B. Models on Underpricing  
For each IPO considered, they were calculated two measures of underpricing: (i) the ‘raw’ 
underpricing, defined as the difference in percentage between the price of the share in the end 
of first day of trading and the offer (listing) price, (ii) the underpricing is ‘adjusted’ for market 
changes, taking into account changes of the Athens Stock Exchange Composite Index (ASE 
CI) between the closing date and the first day of trading measured between the start of the 
public offering and the end of the first day of listing
2
. The difference between the two metrics 
was more visible in the 1990s, when listings used to take place much later than the offering. 
During large time lag periods, many changes in market conditions could occur. As a fact the 
initial return measured may be a result of changes in market conditions. So this is the reason 
raw initial return is adjusted for market changes and variances
3
. 
                                               
2 In this analysis the market index was assumed to be the historical ASEGI index 
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C. Sample Description 
The study examines 208 IPOs listed on the Athens Stock Exchange’s Main and parallel 
boards over the period from 1994 to 2001. The majority of data is hand collected and 
extracted from IPO prospectuses, the daily press and ASE reports. The prospectuses were 
referenced from the library, the ASE website and the Capital Market Commission resource 
centre. Data for the offer price, total gross proceeds, age of IPO companies, percentage of 
shares retained by owners, underwriters, and the closing date of the offer are extracted from 
the prospectuses.    
To be included in the final sample, IPO prospectuses were required to contain precise 
earnings forecast figures. Those prospectuses that provided a forecasted range of expected 
earnings, or other non-specific forms of performance forecast, were excluded from the 
analysis, thus leaving 208 firms in the sample.   
 
V. Determinants of Earnings Forecasts 
 
In order to gain some insight into the reasons for good forecasting performance, a number of 
hypotheses were constructed and tested with respect to potential determinants. Based on past 
research and on a priori reasoning, we have identified fourteen potential determinants of profit 
forecast accuracy. Eight factors were chosen for this study and these are investigated as 
potential determinants of absolute forecast error. Those independent variables are company 
size, forecast horizon, age, financial leverage, underwriter reputation, proportion of shares 
                                                                                                                                                   
3 These calculations are appropriate because the equilibrium prices of stock exchange reflect not only the 
companies’ special characteristics but also, during the formation process, by the ascending and descending of 
capital market.  
4 RIRi,t= Raw initial return of company ‘i’ at period t, MERi,t=Market excess return of company ‘i’ at period t, 
Pi,0=IPO offer price as per prospectus of company ‘i’, Pi,1=Closing price of IPO of company ‘i’ at the end of the 
first trading day, MIi,0=ASE Composite Index at the date of prospectus company ‘i’ 
MIi,1=ASE Composite Index at the close of first trading day of company ‘i’ 
5 MER=Market excess return, MIi,1 and MIi,0 ASE Composite index on day 1 and offer prices setting date. 
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retained by inside owners, industry classification and general economic conditions. Note that 
some of the variables considered by other researchers were not investigated, either because 
they have been only sporadically associated with absolute forecast error or because there was 
not such a case in the Greek market. Table 2 shows the key and most recent studies, and their 
observed significance. 
To find out the possible determinants of AFE and to explore their relative 
relationships, the following hypotheses are constructed:  
 
Firm Size (SIZE): The evidence in the literature suggests that it is easier to forecast the 
profits of larger companies than their smaller counterparts. Cox (1985), Firth and Smith 
(1992), Brown et al. (2000), Chen et al. (2001) and Dutta and Gingler (2002) report that large 
firms have more control over their market setting, enjoy comparative economies of scale, and 
tend to be more diversified than smaller firms. This makes the earnings of larger firms less 
volatile, more predictable, and more accurate.  
On the other hand, smaller companies tend to have less stable earnings, hence there is 
less opportunity for management making a more accurate earnings forecast in the first place 
(Jelic et al, (1998). In the case of small firms, managers have more difficulty in monitoring the 
use of the funds, and have greater difficulty in predicting the firm’s future earnings that flow 
from their deployment.  
Insert Table 2 about here
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However, larger firms are usually more diversified with a higher level of control in 
their market settings. This gives them more control over the level of profits because they have 
better information gathering and forecasting mechanisms. Their forecasts are likely to be 
more accurate than those of the smaller firms.  
  
C1 Larger firms enjoy lower forecasting errors through their ability to use more 
sophisticated forecasting techniques 
 
Period of forecast – Horizon (HOR): There is some support in the literature for a positive 
relationship between FE and forecasting horizon as the forecasting process involves 
uncertainty and risk (i.e. accuracy tends to deteriorate with longer horizons). More 
specifically, there is the view that the longer the forecast horizon, the more likely the 
occurrence of unexpected changes. A brief explanation of the phenomenon is based on the 
amount of information a firm can cluster during the fiscal year. The information helps ensure 
a more secure prediction as it approaches the time for the announcement of the actual results. 
  Chen et al. (2001) argue that forecasting errors can be expected to increase as forecast 
intervals lengthen. They also reveal a significant positive relationship between forecast 
horizon and forecast error. Lee et al. (1993) document that the longer the forecast period, the 
greater is the opportunity for management to exercise discretion in maintenance and capital 
expenditure decisions, thus enabling actual and predicted results to be more closely aligned. 
Brown et al (1987) and Kasznik (1999) show that the shorter the time interval in months 
between the prospectus date and the year end to which the forecast pertains, the more 
accurate the forecast becomes. Based on the above evidence, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
C2 AFE is lower for IPOs that publish their forecast in short horizon periods from the 
fiscal year end. The longer the interval, the greater the error. 
 
Following Lee et al (2006) we measure forecast horizon as the number of months between 
the prospectus date and the end of the forecast period. 
 
Age of Firm (AGE): Previous studies postulate that the longer a firm has been in existence, 
the greater the forecasting accuracy, predominantly because the predictions for earnings for 
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completely new firms are extremely difficult compared to a firm with a solid earnings 
history.  
Jelic et al. (1998) and Jog and McConomy (2003) specify that the profits of 
companies with no prior operating history are likely to be more difficult to forecast, given the 
fact that historical data are a very important input to the process of forecasting. Mak (1994) 
points out that even if a new company is to rely on the operating history of other companies 
in the same or a related industry, the available information on the operating history of those 
companies is likely to be a less reliable predictor of future earnings than one’s own operating 
history.  
Chen et al. (2001) report that older companies may be viewed as being less risky as 
they have more experience to draw on when making forecasts of their profits. On the other 
hand, Jaggi (1997) reports that younger companies may not be able to fully understand and 
appreciate the environmental impact on their future performance, and the lack of historical 
bases may hinder their capability to make accurate forecasts. All those views lead to a third 
hypothesis: 
 
C3 Forecasting accuracy improves the longer the company has been in existence.  
 
We calculate age as the number of years from the date of incorporation until prospectus day.  
 
Financial Leverage (LEV): The net profits of companies with comparatively high levels of 
debt are traditionally regarded as being more difficult to forecast. To accommodate this factor 
as a determinant of forecast accuracy, we introduce the independent variable of leverage. 
Variability in profit and leverage are well accepted in the literature as measures of a 
company’s risk, Hartnett and Romcke, (2000). Chen et al. (2001) employed leverage to 
describe the mix of loan finance and equity finance in a company. They report that profit 
forecasting is more difficult for risky companies that are highly leveraged. 
Eddy and Seifert (1992) in an earlier study document that the higher the financial 
leverage, the higher the risk faced by the firm. In this case, there is the expectation of higher 
error for firms with comparatively high levels of debt. Thus, a negative relationship between 
leverage and the level of accuracy is hypothesised:  
 
C4 Absolute forecast error is positively associated with high levels of financial 
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leverage. 
 
We measure leverage as the ‘long term debt over the total assets’ of the company at the year-
end date of the year under forecast. 
 
Underwriter Reputation (UND): A fifth hypothesis relates to the credibility of 
underwriters. Previous research has examined the importance of reputation signalling and 
reveals that prestigious underwriters are associated with more accurate information, higher 
fees for their services, and are involved in more flotation (through their experience) compared 
with the non-reputable underwriters.  
Titman and Trueman (1986) and Keasey and McGuinness (1991) stress that the 
choice of a high quality underwriter can be viewed as a signalling mechanism where high 
quality underwriters will be selected by firms with more favourable information. They 
suggest that an owner with more favourable information will be willing to pay the fee of a 
more credible advisory body.  
Firth and Smith (1992) and Brown et al. (2000) report that the forecast provided by 
firms going public with a prestigious underwriter is more accurate, as it is likely that the 
forecasts are based on information provided by underwriters. A high quality underwriter is 
argued to have lower agency costs and come at a lower risk for the firm.  
More reputable underwriters are expected to face greater expected loss to reputation, 
in the case of a misrepresentation. Dunbar (2000) and Chen et al. (2001) suggest that large 
forecast errors will damage underwriter reputation and so there is clear incentive to closely 
monitor the profit forecasts. The commentators support that, principally, bankers and 
underwriters add credibility to companies when raising capital. To accommodate this factor 
as a determinant of forecast accuracy, the following hypothesis is constructed: 
 
C5 We hypothesise a negative relationship between the AFE and the reputation of 
the underwriter. 
 
Underwriter reputation (UNW) is a dummy variable taking the value one (1) if the 
underwriter is a reputable bank, otherwise UNW is coded zero (0). 
 
Retained Ownership (OWN): The proportion of retained ownership held by pre-issue 
owners may reflect forecast integrity. A lower proportion may signal owner concern about 
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forecast accuracy while a high level of retained ownership indicates higher confidence and 
forecast achievability. 
Ruland et al. (1990), Firth and Liau-Tan (1997) and Jelic et al. (1998) suggest that a 
higher percentage of management share-ownership may signal that the directors-owners are 
more confident about the future prospects of the company, and are likely to commit more 
resources and attach a greater importance to the earnings forecast as a signal of the quality of 
their company.   
Jog and McConomy (1997) and Chen et al. (2001) report that insiders have other 
means to predict profits, while outsiders have to rely on the prospectus forecast. They argue 
that the larger the number of outside shareholders, the greater the problem if the forecasts are 
inaccurate. Otherwise, the possibility of a decline in share price is less likely to deter 
managers, who retain little or no interest in the firm, from providing optimistic forecasts since 
its limited post-IPO market share affects their wealth less.  
The percentage of post-offer retained ownership to be held by pre-offer owners is 
used as a proxy. To accommodate this factor as a determinant of forecast accuracy, the 
following hypothesis is constructed. 
 
C6 Proportion of shares retained by inside owners is negatively related to absolute 
forecast error. 
  
Industry Classification (IND): Industrial classification has an association with the level of 
forecast accuracy, mainly due to differences in various sectors’ cost structures and revenue 
volatility. This is because each sector faces competition and complexity that may make it 
easier for firms in some industries to forecast more accurately. Prior studies have used 
industry groups when analysing forecast error. In most of the cases, the evidence suggests 
that industrial classified firms are related to forecast accuracy.  
Mak (1989) and Jelic et al. (1998) found ‘industry’ to be a significant variable. They 
argue that earnings forecasts become even more important when the Security Commission 
requires IPOs in specific sectors to provide guarantees for their profit forecast. IPO 
companies in those sectors proved to be less accurate in forecasting their profits than 
companies in other sectors. Hartnett and Romcke (2000) report that since management’s 
forecasting ability relates to the predictability of industry activity, unexpected activity should 
incur a greater forecasting error.  
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For the purpose of the Greek case, we compare companies from the service sector, 
transportation, finance and banking – non industrial firms – that have more unpredicted 
activities with companies from all other sectors – industrial firms – with more predicted 
activities. In order to test this hypothesis, (IND) is assigned a dummy variable of one (1) if 
the company is among the industrial firms (expected sector activities), otherwise IND is 
coded zero (0) if it belongs to service sectors, transportation, finance and banking 
(unexpected sector activities). 
 
C7 A negative association is hypothesised between industrial firms and forecast error.  
 
Economic Condition (ECON): A critical challenge for any economy is the optimal 
allocation of savings to investment opportunities. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the base 
we apply to measure economic conditions
6
.  
           Pedwell et al. (1994) and Hartnett and Romcke (2000) suggest that the ability to 
forecast accurately is influenced by the variability of the economic conditions in effect from 
the beginning to the end of the forecast period. They specify, somewhat obviously, that the 
more unstable economic conditions are, the more difficult it is to forecast accurately. 
Additionally, Chan et al. (1996) report that the larger the fluctuations in economic activity, 
the more the absolute forecast error that one would expect in forecasts. In that case, smaller 
change in GDP produces a lower level of errors in earnings forecasts. To examine this notion, 
the following hypothesis is formulated.  
 
C8 Absolute forecast error tends to be lower the smaller the changes in economic 
conditions (measured by GDP). 
 
Hypothesis one through eight are tested by the following multiple regression using the error 
metrics.  
 
AFE and SUP vary across companies, so we estimate two cross-sectional models to help us 
explain the variations. We test the following model for AFE: 
 
AFE=a+β1
*lnSIZE+β2
*HOR+β3
*AGE+β4
*LEV+β5
*UND+β6
*OWN+β7
*
IND+b8
*ECON+ε , (7)  
 
                                               
6 Gross domestic product represents the total market value of all final goods and services produced in a given year, equal to 
total consumer, investment and government spending, plus the value of exports, minus the value of imports 
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SUP=a+β1
*lnSIZE+β2
*HOR+β3
*AGE+β4
*LEV+β5
*UND+β6
*OWN+β7
*
IND+b8
*ECON+ε, (8)  
 
In the above equation, the absolute forecast error and superiority by management in 
forecasting profits relative to the actual change in profits for each company are used as 
dependent variables. The R
2
 and F-statistics are used to test whether the above-mentioned 
variables could significantly explain absolute forecast error.  
 
VI. Results 
A. Descriptive Statistics  
Distributional statistics of forecast errors, absolute forecast errors and forecasting superiority 
measures are shown in Table 3. The mean forecast error for the sample is 8.04 percent while 
the positive sign for mean forecast earnings reveals that reported profits (actual) exceed their 
forecasted profits. This result contradicts international evidence that management of IPOs are 
typically over-optimistic in their earning forecast. In addition, it is consistent with Allen et al 
(1997), who report that profits are frequently adjusted upward if they are expected to fall 
below forecast, but rarely drift down if the forecast is exceeded.  
Psychology helps us to provide an explanation on the higher reported profits in 
Athens Stock Exchange comparing with forecasted earnings. The Greek mentality allows the 
investors and all interesting parts to accept a pessimistic version of a forecast rather than a 
prediction which overestimates the profit. Further the mandatory disclosure of earnings 
forecasts creates incentives for managers to manipulate earnings during the year following 
the public offering. Indeed, firms who mandatory include earnings forecasts in their offering 
prospectuses are expected to differ from non forecasters of countries with voluntary status in 
their level of earnings management during the year following the public offering. The 
investigation of earnings management in the new issues market is based on the estimation of 
discretionary accruals (e.g., Dechow, (1995); Jones, (1991); Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 
2001).  
The mean absolute forecast error is 42.82 percent. This finding is higher than prior 
data (Firth and Smith (1992);  Lee et al. (1993); Pedwell et al. (1994); Jelic et al. (1998); 
Brown et al. (2000); Lonkani and Firth (2005); Jaggi et al (2006); Gounopoulos and Skinner 
(2010)). The mean forecast error and mean absolute forecast error for Greek IPOs are quite 
small compared to the results of Australia, Canada, China and New Zealand. Overall, the 
earnings forecasts in Greece can be characterised by a medium level of accuracy with a 
pessimistic bias.  
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Panel B of Table 3 sets out the results of the analysis of the four different forecast 
errors discussed and reported below. The reported values suggest that mean FE is 
significantly different from zero at five percent. The mean of AFE is also significantly 
different from zero at the one percent level. Using non-parametric tests for the median, the 
FE is also significantly different from zero. 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the independent variables. The mean age of 
the companies examined is 17.8 years (median 15 years). The maximum value for age is 115 
years and the minimum is a couple of months. The forecast horizon varies between one and 
twelve months. The mean forecast horizon for the sample is 127.33 trading days or 5.5 
months. The size of the sample companies varies substantially. The biggest company 
measured by issue size during the forecast period, amounting to €8.05 billion, is Hellenic 
Telecommunication Organization while the company with the lowest size at €5.3 million is 
Informatics SA.  On average, the owners of the sample firms retained just over three quarters 
of their shares after the IPO with a range from 13.70 to 95.23 percent The average leverage 
(Long term liabilities/ Total Assets) is 7.12 percent with a range of 0.1 percent to 43.39.  
 
Insert Tables 3, 4 about here 
 
Panel A of Table 5 summarizes the forecast errors, together with the Mean Forecast 
Error (MFE) for the IPOs during the specified year. A negative value of MFE implies that the 
earnings forecasts for the IPOs during that particular year are overstated relative to the actual 
earnings reported. The results show a balance in the number of IPOs with positive and 
negative forecast errors. The MFE does not present a specific trend among the years but it is 
worth noting that during year 2001, only two firms had a positive FE and the remaining 11 
had a negative result.  
Panel B of Table 5 indicates the absolute forecast error during each specified year of 
the sample. There are 62 firms with a quite low AFE (less than 20%) while there are 55 firms 
with a high AFE (more than 60%). Individual results show that firms listed during 2000 
experienced the lowest mean AFE. There have been 113 IPOs with an AFE below 40% and 
95 newly listed firms with an AFE over 40%. On the other hand, during 1999, which was one 
of the hot periods for the ASE, the market experienced the highest MAFE. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
  17 
When a firm makes a forecast, the main target is to be as accurate as possible. It is 
rare for a forecast to be 100% accurate so some cases show an optimistic view by the 
management and other cases lean pessimistic. Table 6 classifies IPOs by 
pessimistic/optimistic forecast earnings, containing 101 and 107 firms respectively. The mean 
of forecast error for pessimists is 49.90 percent (median 43.62%) while the mean for 
optimists’ lies at –35.72 percent (median of –31.05%). Panel B of table 3.7 contains the 
values of the t-statistics and the p-values of the parametric pair-sampled and non-parametric 
Wilcoxon-test. The results reveal that there is a high difference between the two samples. 
The ownership of Greek firms is far more concentrated than in the United States, and 
Greek firms may make more use of dual class IPOs, Smart and  Zutter  (2003). Panel C 
classifies IPOs by the level of retained ownership. The results indicate that when the retained 
ownership is high we meet pessimistic earning forecast of -3.04% while in the cases with low 
retained ownership by pre-IPO holders the earning forecast is optimistic at 14.22%.  Thus 
when ownership remain concentrated, controlling owners have an incentive to provide 
outside shareholder and investors less information in order to more freely exercise private 
benefits of control. That could account for the pessimistic forecasts. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
B. Underpricing and ‘money left in the table’  
Table 7, Panel A, summarizes the results obtained by calculating the ‘raw’ and ‘adjusted’ 
mean underpricing over time. The number of firms exhibiting a positive (negative) 
underpricing is also reported. For 1999 results exclude data of some IT company, because of 
their huge underpricing, due to the high-tech and Internet euphoria. The mean ‘simple’ 
underpricing, relative to the whole sample of 208 firms, is equal to 41.85%, (42.67% if one 
considers the ‘adjusted’ return). In 1999, IPOs were significantly underpriced: given that 
during that period the market momentum was favourable, this is consistent with the ‘hot issue 
markets’ theory Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984) and Brailsford et al. (2000)7.  
For the period 1994 to 1996, the average level of underpricing is low (because of the 
daily ±8% price cap which was introduced in the Greek Market in 1993 and was abolished in 
                                               
7 Brailsford et al. (2000) analyze the behavior of the U.S. IPO market. They formally document the existence of hot and cold 
periods. By using a variety of IPO activity measures that capture different aspects of IPO volume, proceeds and underpricing 
the authors identify a number of hot periods over activity measures. They further document a leading relationship between 
underpricing and IPO volume of up to six months, supporting the contention that the decision to issue is a function of current 
underpricing. 
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1997). This price cap was not allowing any IPO overpass this limit during a day and if the 
firm was reaching that level then the trading was immediately interrupted and rescheduled for 
the next day, Thomadakis et al. (2011). Thus the price cap constraints being in force on the 
Greek stock market, exerted substantial limitation into the fair initial price formation of IPOs. 
Carefully study of both IR and MER shows that there is increase in all the following years 
revealing that price cap prevented IPOs from reaching the equilibrium price. 
Analysis of the most recent IPOs seems to reveal a strong reduction in the 
underpricing during 2000, with mean values of about 57%, being even lower in 2001. 
Therefore it is worth investigating the determinants of such a pattern (Table 10).  
Table 7, Panel B computes the amount of money ‘left on the table’8. Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) underlined that underpricing is not the entrepreneur’s primary concern, 
although it may represent an opportunity cost. Issuers are expected to minimize the reduction 
in underpricing-induced wealth losses, which increase with the underpricing but also with the 
number of shares sold in the IPO. Additionally, Loughran and Ritter (2002) noticed that 
entrepreneurs rarely get upset about money left on the table
9
. As Greek inflation has not been 
negligible during the 1990s and early 2000s, all statistics had to be adjusted to reflect 
inflation ratios provided by the Greek Statistical Authority. 
The mean amount of ‘money left on the table’ is equal to €52.722 million (€73.051 
million inflation adjusted). From 1995 to 1999, an increase in the mean amount of wealth 
losses is observed; in contrast, in 2000 the total and mean amounts of ‘money left on the 
table’ decreases and in 2001 are very low. In sum, one cannot report a clear trend in the mean 
amount, because of the influence of large privatization IPOs (Aussenegg (2000), Choi and 
Nam (2006)) (in which the number of offered shares is very large and potential wealth losses 
are larger).  
One would expect underpricing to be lower in IPOs with voluntarily status of earnings 
forecast, coherent with the ‘information gathering theory’ of Benveniste and Spindt (1989). 
In fact, if earnings forecast are not mandatory in the prospectus, the intermediates may 
benefit from the feedback about the level of this information as they have more time to 
reduce uncertainty and may incorporate it in the final offer price. The last is in line with Dutta 
and Gigler (2002) theory that investors benefit from receiving voluntary management 
                                               
8 Money ‘left on the table’ is defined as the offer price to closing market price on the first day of trading, multiplied by the 
number of shares offered. 
9 Introducing the ‘prospect theory’ of issuers’ behaviour, Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that IPOs where wealth losses 
are large are almost invariably those where the offer price and market price are higher than originally expected. Thus, 
controlling issuers generally simultaneously discover they are wealthier than they expected to be, and underpricing may be 
considered an indirect form of underwriter compensation. 
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earnings forecasts despite of related incentives for earnings management. They analytically 
determine that the benefit of receiving earnings forecasts exceeds the cost that investors 
incur. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
 
Table 8, Panel A show that, among the 208 IPO companies, only 30% have an absolute 
forecast error (AFE) below a value of 0.2 while 36.5% have an AFE above 0.5. Most 
companies have an AFE value of 0.1 through 0.2, while only eight companies among the 
Greek IPOs have an AFE greater than 1.00. Overall, it does not seem to be the case that many 
of the newly issued companies reported their actual profit earnings very close to their actual 
earnings. The study of forecast error shows that 42% of the Greek forecasts were clustered 
among ± 0.02% of actual earnings. This percentage is not satisfactory therefore, the 
management of future IPOs should make additional efforts for the improved forecasting of 
earnings. 
Panel B examines the relation between the accuracy of management forecasts and the 
pricing of IPOs. The results indicate that the average level of underpricing in most of the 
AFE categories is near the mean level of returns (41.85% for raw returns and 42.67% for 
excess returns), although there are some notable differentiations in the categories with high 
AFEs. 
Specifically, the riskiest IPOs (i.e., those with an AFE higher than 1.00) present an 
extremely high level of underpricing, which is mainly explained by Sherman and Titman’s 
(2002) theory of information disclosure. They observe that the riskiest firms are the most 
underpriced, as the institutional investors do not feel confident and need more private 
information to reduce uncertainty about the firm’s value. The level of underpricing for newly 
listed firms with AFEs between 0.8 and 1 is both surprising and inconsistent with the trend of 
IPOs with AFEs less than 1, as the returns to investors vary, on average, from 14.16% to 
30.41%. 
 
Insert Table 8 about here. 
 
 
 The findings on FEs shed more light on the phenomenon of IPO pricing and its 
relation to the forecast error. The issuers of IPOs with the most pessimistic forecasts seem to 
be rewarded for these predictions, as their firms are underpriced only by 9.05%. On the other 
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hand, the Greek market shows unique maturity as it recognizes at an early stage the IPOs 
with optimistic forecasts and penalizes them with a high level of underpricing. Finally, the 
IPOs with perfect forecasts are not rewarded for this precise information, as their 
underpricing is exactly on the average of our total sample. We conclude that it is better to 
provide a pessimistic forecast of the earnings in the prospectus, as this is a signal for low 
underpricing in the aftermarket.  
 
C. Cross sectional regression results for AFE  
Multiple regression techniques can be used to take further investigation of forecast errors. A 
first issue of concern, before proceeding into the regressions, is the multi-collinearity test. 
The Pearson Correlation Matrix between the independent variables in table 9 shows that the 
highest correlation appears between SIZE-ECON with a negative coefficient of (0.453).  
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
The results of the multiple regression models are shown in table 9. The regression is 
highly significant (p=0.008) but with an adjusted R
2
 of only 9.6 percent. An individual study 
of the variables starts with size, which has not proved to be statistically related to forecast 
accuracy. The coefficient for size variable has the opposite sign to our prediction. Thus, the 
trend of our finding is consistent with the results reported by Firth and Smith ((1992)), Chan 
et al. ((1996)), and Baginski and Hassell ((1997)), who found that managers in larger firms 
tend to be less accurate than managers in smaller firms.  
The coefficient for horizon is consistent (positive) with our expectations for absolute 
forecast error but it is not significant at any level. This result is consistent with the results 
reported by Firth and Smith (1992). Jelic et al. (1998) link the lack of significance with the 
relatively short forecast horizon during which new funds are more difficult to estimate. The 
next variable to study is the age coefficient, which is highly statistically related to absolute 
forecast error. This finding is in line with all evidence, indicating that profits of companies 
with a shorter operating history are intrinsically more difficult to forecast and indeed older 
firms announce more accurate forecast profits. Our result for age is consistent with the results 
reported by Firth and Smith (1992), indicating greater forecast accuracy for firms with longer 
operating histories.  
The coefficient for leverage (long-term debt over total assets) is positive – consistent 
with the hypothesised positive sign – and statistically insignificant. This result shows that the 
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leverage control factor is in the correct direction but is not powerful enough to explain 
absolute forecast accuracy. The result confirms the findings of Eddy and Seifert (1992) and 
Chen et al. (2001), that the higher the financial leverage, the higher the risk faced by the 
company and the higher the absolute forecast error reported. 
The underwriters’ reputation variable has a positive sign, opposite from our 
hypothesis that the coefficient would be insignificant. In the Greek case, it appears that more 
non-reputable underwriters seem to be associated with better predictive accuracy. This result 
is inconsistent with the findings of Chen et al. (2001) and Jog and McConomy (2003), which 
had suggested more accurate forecast by management for firms that were underwritten by 
reputable underwriters. 
The coefficient for industry is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. This outcome is consistent with the results of Chan et al. ((1996)), Jelic et al. ((1998)), 
and Hartnett & Romcke ((2000) in suggesting that non-industrial firms (unexpected sector 
activities) are associated with a higher level of earnings forecast error. Finally, the ‘Econ’ 
variable has an unexpected negative sign, while the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
The results show that the economic condition in Greece has a negative impact on the AFE.  
The explanatory power of the superiority regression model (SUP) in forecasting 
profits relative to the actual profits is lower than the AFE (R
2 
=
 
8.1%). In summary, the 
results on the superiority in forecasting profits reveals a greater capability of the management 
of old firms to predict the earnings of the firm. The result for ‘age’ coefficient is consistent 
with the hypothesis and it is statistically significant. The result is inconsistent with the results 
reported by Chen et al. (2001), in showing greater a superiority in forecasting profits on the 
part of firms with a short history.  
The ‘own’ variable is also statistically significant. The positive sign is consistent with 
our hypothesis that low-retained ownership by entrepreneurs tends to increase management 
superiority in their ability to forecast profits. It might also account for the negative relation 
between retained ownership by entrepreneurs and management superiority in forecasting 
profits. A third variable, which significantly influences superiority, is industry classification. 
This outcome suggests that industrial-classified firms are associated with a lower level of 
management error. The other five factors (i.e. size, forecast horizon, leverage, underwriter 
reputation, and change of economic condition) that we tested do not indicate any statistical 
significance in explaining superiority.  
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The market excess returns results of the regressions, corrected for heteroskedasticity, 
are also presented in Table 10. We find three factors that significantly affect the pricing of 
IPOs in Greece: the size of the firm, its leverage and the change in economic conditions.  
Regarding the offering size of IPOs, we find a significantly negative relationship with 
the market excess returns, which is in line with Ritter (1984), Beatty (1989) and Levis (1993). 
As we expected, a smaller offering size of a company means a lower marketability of the 
stock post-floatation; thus, the investors will face higher risk. Moreover, manipulation of 
price by institutional investors is a common practice in Greece. A smaller floatation size 
means that institutional investors can easier control a company’s stock price, thus increasing 
speculation and uncertainty of the future price performance of the stocks. Therefore, as one of 
the proxies of risk and uncertainty, the offering size has a negative effect on the initial 
returns. 
The second proxy employed to test the MER and significantly affects it, is the 
leverage of the IPO. The estimation result shows significance with a negative sign on the 
coefficient which opposes our expectation. When an issuer decides to go public with a highly 
indebted firm, investors expect the company not to have such great potential for future 
development and price performance while at the same time the risk of the company is high. 
In this case, to compensate for the extra risk investors take, IPOs with high-leverage features 
would be more underpriced.  
  We find that for listed firms, economic progress is associated with high market excess 
returns. This lends support to the proposition that since the government knows more than 
investors about - the state of the economy, the quality of all issuing companies and the level 
of risk involved in initial issues - to convince and attract investors to invest in the IPO 
market, makes the government to technically influence underpricing of IPOs. 
 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Studies on the accuracy of earnings forecasts by management in the IPO prospectuses are 
limited mainly to commonwealth countries due to the lack of such forecasts in other markets. 
This could be due to the fact that making a specific quantitative forecast in some countries 
may entail risks that could be costly (US and Canada) and that forecasts are voluntary 
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(Australia, Canada, Denmark, UK and Hong Kong). Greece is one of the few countries where 
the management of the IPOs is required to disclose profit forecasts in their prospectuses.  
In this study the forecast accuracy is measured for 208 companies during the period 
1994-2001. The results suggest that, on average, managers’ understate earnings by 8.04 
percent (median of 2.12%) while the mean absolute forecast error is 42.82 percent (median of 
36.55%). The small difference between mean and median values indicates a small positive 
skew in the distribution of 0.80 for FE and 1.97 for AFE. Outliers had a major impact on FE. 
The elimination of these outliers decreases the FE to 3.91%. Descriptive statistics reveal that 
the forecast error is not normally distributed.  
Cross-sectional regression equations are used to model absolute forecast error and 
forecast superiority. AFE in Greece is associated with the age of the firm, suggesting that 
IPOs with little operating history experience higher forecast error. Similarly, industrial 
categorised firms are associated with a higher level of forecast accuracy. Our results provide 
no support for size, forecast horizon, underwriter reputation and economic conditions.     
This study also focused upon the superiority of management in forecasting profits 
relative to the actual change in profits. Positive value for SUP means that the Greek IPO 
profit forecast is more accurate than a forecast based on the random walk model. Overall, the 
results reveal that three factors – age of the firm, retained ownership and industry variables – 
have statistical significance with the superiority factor.  
The study finds that reported profits exceed their forecast profits, and the result 
contradicts international evidence that management of IPOs is typically overoptimistic in 
earnings forecasts. The main reason is that Greek managers feel too weak and inexperienced 
to predict the earnings behaviour of their firms in the market, so, in this case, they prefer to 
report conservative earnings forecasts that ultimately prove to be much less when compared 
with the actual profit, than an optimistic earning forecast that will not be verified by the 
actual results. Additionally, managers are scared of providing an optimistic view, as they fear 
their investor critics in the future, which could possibly detrimentally affect their firms.  
The first-day return of our sample obtaining a mean (adjusted) underpricing equal to 
41.85% (42.67%). It verified that underpricing is particularly high during ‘hot issue’ markets, 
and has been decreasing during the late 2000 and whole 2001. The findings run consistently 
to US evidence, where IPOs have been more heavily underpriced in 1998, 1999 and 2000 
than in previous years. Yet, the comparison between the two markets reveals that both 
experienced the tech bubble of Technology Company. This suggests that similar to US in 
Greece the huge level of IPO underpricing in 1999 and 2000 was partly due to technology 
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stocks. Moreover, it was verified that the pricing process is affected by several other 
determinants as the size of the firm, their leverage and the economic conditions of the market. 
The findings of this study have serious implications to investors, shareholders and 
policy makers. First, investors should closely look the earnings prediction in the prospectus 
before they will reach their final decision as the way earnings forecast information is 
disclosed in IPO prospectuses is of great importance. Wrong decisions by both investors and 
shareholders – if they will keep position - may be costly especially in the long term. Second, 
as we document medium absolute forecast error in this study, it appears there is window for 
improvement by the policy makers’ side. The mandatory status which forces any firm to 
provide earnings forecast in the prospectus no matter of their ability shows that disclosure of 
earnings forecast information without penalty can lead to unreliable forecasts. This result 
reinforces the role of voluntary financial disclosures as a means to reduce information 
asymmetry. This research could have implications for stock market regulators, as it suggests 
that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts may deteriorate the efficiency of the markets 
by increasing forecast error. 
Emphasis should continue to be placed upon research into the variables of prospectus 
forecast accuracy. Even if the contributions today have been instructive, none have provided 
substantial explanations. However, we have proposed two interesting aspects for further 
consideration, which will help to improve collective knowledge on the subject. Initially, we 
need to investigate whether managers take action to improve accuracy by managing reported 
profits. Second, as the regulation for mandatory disclosure of forecast earnings has changed 
in Greece in favor of voluntary disclosure, it will be interesting to provide the first 
comparative study on an international level for the same market. 
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TABLE 1. Summary of previous studies on the accuracy of forecast earnings 
Results reported are based on the following error metrics: FE=[(APit-FPit)/|FPit|]*100 and AFE=|(APit-FPit)|/|FPit|]*100. In Dev and Webb (1972) , the forecast error based on the ratio between  
the reported and forecast profits before corporation tax. Forecast error in Clarkson et al. (1992) as FE=(FPit-APit)/|FPit|. Forecast error in Tan  (1987) is calculated as FE=(FPit-APit)/|APit|.  
Country Study Period Sample Forecast Error 
(%) 
Absolute Forecast 
error (%) 
FE Range (%) 
Australia Blair and Taylor (1989) 1977-1986     
 Lee (1993) 1987-1989  994 1138  
 Brown et al. (2000) 1980-1996 431 -7.95   
 Hartnett & Romcke (2000) 1991-1996 134 -30.35 88.29  
       
Canada Pedwell et al. (1994) 1983-1987 112 -77.7 88 +101.3 to -3958.5 
 Clarkson (1992) 1984-1987 93 99 NA +3958.to NA 
 Clarkson (2000) 1992-1996  23.1 NA  
       
China Chen and Firth (1999) 1989-1996 125  13.25  
       
Hong Kong Chan et al.  (1996) 1990-1992 110 12 18  
 Jaggi (1997) 1990-1994 160 6.5 12.79  
 Chen et al. (2001) 1993-1996 162 9.94 21.96  
       
Malaysia Jelic et al (1998) 1984-1995 122 33.37 54.1 4110.53 to -136.17 
       
New Zealand (m) Mak (1989) 1983-1987 71 NA 100  
 Firth & Smith (1992) 1983-1986 89 -92 328 3047 to -12393 
 Firth  (1997) 1979-1987 143 -91 111  
       
Singapore Tan et al (1987) 1972-1984 51 24 NA  
 Firth (1998) 1977-1992 116 20.11 10.4  
       
South Africa Mbuthia and Ward (2003)  1980-1998 506 14.3   
Taiwan  Jaggi et al (2006) 1994-2001 759 20   
Thailand Lonkani and Firth (2005) 1991-1996 175 -6.86 35.76  
U.K Dev and Web (1972) 1968-1969 212 112 NA 46.6 to 196.4 
 Keasey & McGuinness (1991) 1984-1986 121 5 11  
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TABLE 2. Potential determinants of prospectus forecast errors investigated in prior studies 
 Variable analysed in study. *Significant association with forecast error 
Study Keasey & 
McGuinness 
(1991) 
UK 
Firth & 
Smith 
(1992) 
N. Zealand 
  Lee et al 
(1993) 
Australia 
Pedwell 
et al 
(1994) 
Canada 
Chan et al 
(1996) 
Hong 
Kong 
Jelic et al 
(1998) 
Malaysia 
Hartnett 
& 
Romcke 
(2000) 
Australia 
Chen et al 
(2001) 
Hong 
Kong 
Jog & 
McConomy 
(2003) 
Canada 
Lonkani 
& Firth 
(2005) 
Thailand 
Age    *  *   *  
Size  *    *  *  * 
Forecast Interval *  * *      * 
Industry      * *    
Macro. Conditions    *       
Float Year           
Leverage           
Audit Quality    *   *  *  
Underwriter  *          
Growth Prospects           
Profit volatility     *   *   
Equity retained        *   
Type of Issue           
Range of activities           
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TABLE 3. Summary statistics of IPO profit accuracy 
This table shows profit forecast accuracy using five metrics. The four measures are forecast error, absolute forecast error, square route 
forecast error and forecast superiority. FE, Forecast Error = (APit-FPit)/│FPit│; AFE, Absolute Forecast Error =│ (APit-FPit) │/│FPit│ 
and SQFE, Square Forecast Error= (APit-FPit/FPit); SUP = ln[((APit-APit-1) /(APit-FPit))
2. FE = profit forecast error; AP = actual profit; FP 
= profit forecast as given in the IPO prospectus; For FE, test of average (mean and median=0 vs. average not=0; For AFE and SQFE, test 
of average (mean and median)=0 vs. average>0; Test statistics (*) and p-values [*] indicate the level of significance different from zero 
using the Wilcoxon median test. *** Significant at the one per cent level **Significant at the five per cent level *Significant at the ten per 
cent level 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
Variable  FE (%) AFE (%) SQFE (%) SUP 
Mean 8.04 42.82 3044 2.25 
Median 2.12 36.55 1340 1.55 
St. Dev 54.39 34.67 5937 2.35 
Min -105.30 0.38 0.14 -2.35 
Max 234.82 234.82 55140 14.31 
Skewness 0.80 1.97 5.59 1.94 
Kyrtosis 1.47 6.77 39.21 5.29 
Sample Size 208 208 208 208 
Panel B: Parametric and Non Parametric tests 
 Test Method 
 Parametric Test 
(One sample T-test) 
Non parametric Tests 
 T-test,  p value Kolmogov Smirnov,  
p-value 
Wilcoxon test,  p-value 
FE (2.137), [0.034] (0.996), [0.275] [0.016] 
AFE (17.834), [0.000] (1.592), [0.013] [0.000] 
SQFE (7.378), [0.000] (4.375), [0.000] [0.000] 
SUP (1.009), [0.314] (1.604), [0.012] [0.162] 
 
TABLE 4. Description Statistics of continuous and discrete independent variables  
Notes: This table lists the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cross sectional regressions; The independent variables are: Size, 
logarithm of number of shares issued times the offer price; Horizon = length of the forecast period. This is the number of days 
between the prospectus date and the next fiscal year end; Age = the number of years from the date of the company’s incorporation to the 
IPO date; LEV = by total debt over the total assets of the company at the year–end date of the year under forecast; UNW = a dummy 
variable taking the value of one, if the underwriter is National Bank of Greece, Commercial Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank, EFG Eurobank, 
and Piraeus Bank, otherwise UNW is coded zero; Own = proportion of shares retained by insiders/owners; IND = dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the company is an industrial classified firm, otherwise IND is coded zero if IPO belongs to service 
sector, transportation, finance and banking; ECON = the change in economic condition, measured by taking the annual growth 
(measured as a percentage) in GDP for the year of flotation. 
Description Statistics of continuous and discrete independent variables 
Variable  SIZE 
(€ m) 
HOR 
(days) 
AGE 
(years) 
LEV 
(%) 
UND 
 
OWN 
(%)  
IND ECON 
(%) 
Mean 85.28 127.3 17.86 7.12  80.82  9.74 
Median 20.27 130 15 2.81  80.37  9.9 
Proportion=1     0.67  0.72  
St. Dev 27.6 75.41 17.75 9.61  9.30  2.81 
Min 0.55 1 0 0.1  13.70  5.5 
Max 2380 262 115 43.39  96.86  23.5 
Skewness   6.09 0.01 2.75 2.05  -4.26  0.63 
Kyrtosis 40.76 -1.039 9.60 3.48  30.27  0.94 
Sample Size 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 
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TABLE 5. Summary of FE and AFE by year of listing 
Panel A: Percentage Forecast Error 
Listing Year <-30% -30% to 0% 0% to 30% Over 30% Total MFE (%) 
1994 13 11 7 14 45 0.36 
1995 3 3 5 8 19 25.94 
1996 4 4 4 5 17 19.11 
1997 2 1 2 5 10 -6.21 
1998 5 4 6 9 24 15.48 
1999 6 7 6 12 31 20.25 
2000 13 13 11 12 49 1.36 
2001 6 5 1 1 13 -36.22 
Total 52 48 42 66 208 8.04 
Panel B: Percentage Absolute Forecast Error 
Listing Year <20% 20% to 40% 40% to 60% Over 60% Total MAFE (%) 
1994 10 14 10 11 45 42.65 
1995 5 6 3 5 19 38.45 
1996 7 2 2 6 17 49.86 
1997 2 3 2 3 10 40.17 
1998 9 3 5 7 24 39.00 
1999 8 6 8 9 31 51.13 
2000 17 14 9 9 49 37.49 
2001 4 3 1 5 13 47.49 
Total 62 51 40 55 208 42.82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  32 
 
TABLE 6. Forecast Error (FE) and Absolute Forecast Error (AFE) categorisation by 
pessimistic/optimistic forecast and High/Low retained ownership 
Test statistics and p-values [*] indicate the level of significance for the differences in mean (T-Tests) and median (Wilcoxon test); *** 
Significant at one percent level; **Significant at five percent level; *Significant at one percent level  
Panel A: Categorization of pessimistic/optimistic forecast 
Trend of forecast  No of IPOs    FE Mean FE Median AFE Mean 
Pessimistic  101   -35.72 -31.05 35.72 
Optimistic  107   49.90 43.62 49.90 
        
All  208   8.04 2.48 42.82 
Panel B: Statistics for difference in means and medians 
t-statistics for difference in means Wilcoxon test for difference in median 
 FE   FE  
 -8.524 [0.000]***   -8.725 [0.000]***  
Panel C: Categorization of High/Low Retained Ownership  
Trend of forecast  No of IPOs    FE Mean FE Median AFE Mean 
High Retained Own  101   -3.04 -2.32 41.10 
Low Retained Own  107   14.22 13.21 43.35 
        
All  208   8.04 2.48 42.82 
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TABLE 7. IPOs mean underpricing (first day return), by listing year & money left in the table by 
listing year 
The underpricing is adjusted by considering the market index return between the issue of the offer price and the listing. The number of 
days between the first day of the offering and the trading is reported. Sample: 208 IPOs on the Greek Stock Exchange between January 
1994 and December 2001. 
Panel A: IPOs mean underpricing (first day return) 
 Underpricing (%) Adjusted Underpricing 
Year IPOs Mean Positive Negative Mean Positive Negative Days 
1994 45 5.41% 40 5 6.62% 36 9 34.5 
1995 19 4.72% 16 3 4.08% 11 8 43.3 
1996 17 5.59% 15 2 5.65% 15 2 30.5 
1997 10 19.91% 7 3 32.21% 8 2 33.1 
1998 24 51.64% 20 4 51.59% 22 2 33.1 
1999 31 102.78% 30 1 98.02% 30 1 31.7 
2000 49 57.35% 38 11 56.79% 40 9 24.6 
2001 13 34.61%                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        7 6 37.85% 9 4 23.7
         
Total 208 41.85% 173 35 42.67% 171 37 31.03 
         
Panel B: Money left in the table  
Year Sample Size Total €m Total 
(Inflation adj) 
Mean €m Mean 
(Inflation adj) 
1994 45 47.079 49.121 1.120 1.169 
1995 19 13.019 14.926 0.685 0.785 
1996 17 411.609 511.259 19.600 24.345 
1997 10 1655.898 2205.241 183.988 245.026 
1998 24 3855.876 5274.359 124.383 170.140 
1999 31 6284.080 8845.797 110.247 155.189 
2000 49 3167.786 4420.890 64.648 90.222 
2001 13 52.075 75.479 2.373 3.281 
      
Total 208 1611.956 2148.742 52.722 73.051 
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TABLE 8. Distribution of dependent variable Absolute Forecast Error and Forecast error 
 
Panel A: Distribution of dependent variable Absolute Forecast Error and Forecast error 
Distribution of AFE No of IPO  
Cum 
Percentage 
Distribution of 
FE No of IPOs 
Cum 
Percentage 
0<AFE≤0.1 26 12.50 FE≤-0.8 7 3.40 
0.1<AFE≤0.2 36 17.30 -0.8<FE≤0.6 12 5.80 
0.2<AFE≤0.3 27 13.00 -0.6<FE≤-0.4 22 10.60 
0.3<AFE≤0.4 24 11.55 -0.4<FE≤-0.2 29 14.00 
0.4<AFE≤0.5 20 9.60 -0.2<FE≤0 32 15.45 
0.5<AFE≤0.6 20 9.60 0<FE≤0.2 31 15 
0.6<AFE≤0.7 18 8.65 0.2<FE≤0.4 25 11.60 
0.7<AFE≤0.8 11 5.30 0.4<FE≤0.6 17 8.20 
0.8<AFE≤0.9 10 4.80 0.6<FE≤0.8 15 7.25 
0.9<AFE≤1.00 8 3.85 0.8<FE≤1.00 11 5.30 
AFE≥100 8 3.85 FE≥1.00 7 3.40 
      
Panel B: IR and MER distributed by level of AFE and FE   
Distribution of AFE IR  MER Dist. of FE IR MER 
0<AFE≤0.1 41.21 40.30 FE≤-0.8 4.53 9.05 
0.1<AFE≤0.2 50.72 50.75 -0.8<FE≤0.6 49.56 51.47 
0.2<AFE≤0.3 60.63 63.12 -0.6<FE≤-0.4 21.97 25.03 
0.3<AFE≤0.4 39.89 38.57 -0.4<FE≤-0.2 38.94 39.62 
0.4<AFE≤0.5 21.79 24.90 -0.2<FE≤0 38.55 39.70 
0.5<AFE≤0.6 41.25 43.05 0<FE≤0.2 49.67 49.53 
0.6<AFE≤0.7 43.34 42.81 0.2<FE≤0.4 57.16 59.04 
0.7<AFE≤0.8 43.24 42.60 0.4<FE≤0.6 37.90 39.22 
0.8<AFE≤0.9 13.54 14.16 0.6<FE≤0.8 39.81 39.06 
0.9<AFE≤1.00 32.32 30.41 0.8<FE≤1.00 30.40 27.29 
AFE≥1.00 71.40 74.93 FE≥1.00 71.40 74.93 
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TABLE 9. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table lists the correlations among variables used in the cross sectional regressions. *** Significant at the one per cent level. 
**Significant at the five per cent level *Significant at the ten per cent level 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 SIZE 1.000        
2 HOR -0.061 1.000       
3 AGE 0.149* 0086 1.000       
4 LEV 0.047 -0.013 0.102 1.000     
5 UND -0.299** -0.039 0.035 0.039 1.000    
6 OWN 0.155* -0.027 0.127 0.216** -0.052 1.000   
7 IND -0.115 0.003 0.122 -0.128 -0.125 0.137 1.000  
8 ECON -0.453** 0.061 -0.076 -0.102 -0.292** -0.223** 0.135* 1.000 
 
TABLE 10. Cross sectional regression results of AFE, SUP  
This table lists the variables used in the cross sectional regressions; The independent variables are: Size = logarithm of number of shares 
issued times the offer price (issue size); Horizon = length of the forecast period. This is the number of months between the prospectus date 
and the next fiscal year end; Age = the number of years from the date of the company’s incorporation to the IPO date; LEV = by long 
term debt over the total assets of the company at the year–end date of the year under forecast; UNW = a dummy variable taking the value 
of one, if the underwriter is National Bank of Greece, Commercial Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank, EFG Eurobank and Piraeus Bank, 
otherwise UNW is coded zero; OWN = proportion of shares retained by insiders/pre IPO owners; IND = dummy variable taking the value 
of one if the company is industrial classified, otherwise IND is coded zero if IPO belongs to service sector - transportation, finance and 
banking, ECON = the change in economic condition, measured by taking the annual growth (measured as a percentage in GDP for the 
year of flotation; The t-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity; t-values are in parenthesis; *** Significant at the one per cent level; 
**Significant at five per cent level;  *Significant at ten per cent level 
Specifications AFE SUP IR MER 
Constant 128.74 -4.67 388.66 370.88 
 (1.849)* (-0.924) (4.995)*** (4.714)*** 
SIZE 0.032 -0.026 -0.185 -0.183 
 (0.568)  (-0.355)  (-2.491)**  (-2.401)** 
HOR 0.018 0.069 -0.052 -0.084 
 (0.255)  (1.165)  (-0.780)  (-1.231) 
AGE -0.172 -0.158 -0.070 -0.066 
  (-2.333)**  (-2.069)**  (-1.122)  (-1.032) 
LEV 0.043 0.009 -0.135 -0.138 
  (0.829)  (0.126)  (-2.077)**  (-2.072)** 
UND 0.046 -0.001 -0.064 -0.057 
 (0.742)  (-0.018)  (-0.981)  (-0.862) 
OWN -0.092 0.148 -0.083 -0.090 
  (-0.877)  (2.234)**  (-1.276)  (-1.354) 
IND -0.198 -0.184 -0.024 -0.027 
  (-2.367)**  (-2.404)**  (-0.373)  (-0.410) 
ECON -0.026 0.090 -0.455 -0.392 
 (-0.413) (1.180) (-6.742)*** (-5.661)*** 
     
R2 0.096 0.081 0.214 0.172 
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R2 Adjusted 0.060 0.043 0.185 0.141 
F-value (2.68) (2.18) (7.25) (5.53) 
 
